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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL 
SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL 
AIRWAYS, INC., 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 14335 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent's brief does not meet factual or legal 
issues raised by Appellant. Respondent's brief is rather an 
artful attempt to disguise and,avoid the true issues. 
As an aid and convenience to the trial court, counsel 
for Appellant and counsel for Respondent laboriously drafted and 
executed a detailed stipulation of fact (R. 806) . Appellant will 
not burden this record with a detailed analysis of the factual 
account in Respondent's brief. Suffice it to say that the true 
and binding factual background is set forth for the Court in the 
stipulation of the parties. Respondent's brief is in large measure 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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an attempt to avoid these stipulated facts and to argue issues 
not raised by the appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS ANALYSIS OF THE "FALLING OUT" 
BETWEEN APPELLANT AND PRESTIGE HAS NOTHING 
TO DO WITH THE INSTANT CASE. 
This court has noted that"it is not always true that 
a broker who is negotiating a transaction must be exclusively 
the agent of one (seller) or the other (buyer). He may well be 
a 'go-between1 acting for both". Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 
530 P.2d 815, 817 (Utah 1974). 
This lav/suit deals with the relationship between a 
broker (appellant) and a seller (respondent). Respondent's brief 
seeks to disguise the true issue by focusing on the relationship 
between the broker (appellant) and the buyer (Prestige). For 
purposes of this lawsuit, it simply doesn't matter how or why 
Prestige and Appellant had a "falling out", although Respondent's 
brief weaves a most fanciful tale about how and why it happened. 
This case must be decided by examining the duties which the 
seller (respondent) owes to its agent or broker (appellant). 
-2-
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POINT II 
THE FACTS ESTABLISH CONCLUSIVELY THAT APPELLANT 
WAS EMPLOYED AS A BROKER BY RESPONDENT. 
The threshold issue in this case is to accurately 
characterize the relationship between Appellant and Respondent, 
The duties and responsibilities of the parties will clearly 
follow from an accurate identification of that relationship. 
Here Respondent takes the unsupported position that: 
"Under the undisputed facts appellant was simply 
the agent of Prestige to obtain quotations on 
charter flights from respondent." (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 24) 
* * * * * 
"Here it is clear that Prestige not respondent 
hired appellant;" (Brief of Respondent, p. 29) 
[Emphasis in original] 
* * * * * 
"Respondent had not hired and did not "fire" 
Appellant". (Brief of Respondent, p. 34) 
Appellant does not deny that it was in some respects 
the agent for Prestige. However, the facts clearly show that 
Appellant was at the same time the agent for Respondent. Foster 
v. Blake Heights Corp., supra. 
This agency relationship is established by extensive 
factual development (R. 809, 810), as well as overwhelming case 
authority (Brief of Appellant, p. 9). Respondent's Brief under-
takes no rebuttal to any of these facts or authorities. In 
addition, this agency relationship is conclusively established 
by a specific brokerage agreement which is in evidence by 
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stipulation of the parties (R. 819, 825). 
In light of such agreement, the existence of which was 
stipulated between the parties, it is simply incredible for 
Respondent to deny the existence of a brokerage or agency rela-
tionship between Appellant and Respondent. The decisive fact is 
simply that the Respondent pays a brokerage or sales commission 
every time a travel agent completes a sale and did so in the 
instant case in connection with the Chain "C" and Chain "Dn 
flights. If the travel agent is not a broker why does the air-
line pay the sales commission. Appellant requested the trial 
court to make and enter a specific finding and conclusion on 
the issue of agency between the parties (R. 829) The trial court 
made none. A finding on this issue is clearly material to the 
resolution of this lawsuit. An examination of the duties and 
responsibilities between Appellant and Respondent requires the 
Court to first establish the nature of the legal relationship 
which creates such duties and responsibilities. The trial court's 
refusal to make such a finding was, Appellant respectfully submits, 
error. 
POINT III 
THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE INSTANT CASE IS THE DUTY OF 
GOOD FAITH WHICH A SELLER OWES TO ITS BROKER OR AGENT. 
Respondent's only defense in this entire lawsuit is 
that Appellant was not entitled to the 5% sales commission on 
the Chain !IC" and Chain "D" flights unless and until Prestige 
had signed the charter agency agreement. 
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Appellant concedes that the parties anticipated the 
final execution of the formal charter agency agreement. Appellant 
further concedes that Prestige refused to sign the charter agency 
agreement for the Chain "C" and Chain "Dn flights. The issue in 
this case is why Prestige refused to sign. In other words, did 
Prestige refuse to sign because Respondent violated its duties 
of good faith to Appellant. 
In point of fact Respondent violated its duties to 
Appellant in several particulars: 
First, a specific term of the brokerage agreement, was 
a promise by Respondent not to compete with Appellant in connec-
tion with the agency (Tr. 42, 43). Notwithstanding this undisputed 
promise not to compete, Respondent initiated direct negotiations 
with Prestige in direct competition with Appellant. Respondent's 
conduct violated not only a term of the agreement but the well 
settled doctrine that a principal has a duty to refrain from 
unreasonably interfering with the work and performance of its 
2 
agent. 
Second, Appellant was only authorized to negotiate 
with Prestige by demanding large up front deposits for charter 
flights. However, when Respondent negotiated directly with 
It has long been well settled that a principal is 
under a duty to exercise good faith toward a broker 
with whom the principal deals and is liable to the 
broker in the event of the principal's failure to 
do so. 12 Am. Jur. 2d § 100. 
Restatement of Agency (2d), § 434. 
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Prestige, Respondent designed a "floating deposit" which in 
essence meant that Respondent sold the Chain "C" and Chain "D" 
flights with no separate deposit required (Tr. 277, 278). 
Third, notwithstanding the terms of the brokerage 
agreement, Respondent refused to provide Appellant with price 
quotations which Appellant needed to close the deal (R. 826), 
Fourth, Respondent entered into an arrangement whereby 
the 5% commission went directly to Prestige (R. 828, Tr. 318). 
These techniques proved successful and the flights as 
negotiated by Appellant were sold and flown by Respondent. 
Appellant received no commission for its efforts in connection 
with such flights. 
In light of the foregoing, it is little wonder that 
Prestige failed to sign the charter agency agreement. Respondent 
and Prestige could simply make a better deal by cutting Appellant 
out and that is exactly what they did. 
Respondent argues that it made no difference to Respondent 
whether the 5% commission was paid to Appellant or Prestige (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 3). Thus, presumably Respondent had no motive 
to circumvent Appellant as a broker. The facts are otherwise. 
It is clear from the record that not only was Respondent bidding 
against other airlines for the Prestige business but that Prestige 
was prepared to enter into an agreement with a competing carrier 
(Tr. 274, 275-277, Ex. D-31). 
In other words, Respondent was being underbid by 
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other airlines on the Prestige account. However, Respondent 
could not lower the price to meet the competition because of 
3 its own filed tariffs. To remedy this situation, Respondent 
hit upon the idea of giving the 5% sales commission directly 
to Prestige instead of paying Appellant thereby effectively 
reducing its price by 5%. The success of the plan is evidenced 
by the fact that Respondent has in fact sold several million 
dollars of charter flights to Prestige (Tr. 125). 
Appellant's brief cites a host of cases which hold 
that a principal or seller cannot unfairly avoid paying a sales 
commission (Brief of Appellant, p. 18). Respondent's brief 
failed to cite one case to meet this central issue of the case. 
Respondent has instead artfully tried to disguise and 
avoid the issue. For example, Respondent argues (and without 
any supporting authority) that real estate broker cases are not 
analogous to this case (Brief of Respondent, p. 28). Respondent 
has cited no cases which hold that different principles of law 
apply depending upon the type of merchandise to be sold. In 
point of fact, one of the key cases upon which Appellant relies 
has to do with a fish broker, Abels v. Iceland Products, Inc., 
274 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960). Another key case upon which 
Appellant relies, deals with a financing broker, Weinger v. 
Union Center Plaza Associates, 387 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
See, also, Bamford v. Cope, Colo. App., 499 P.2d 639 (1972). 
The Federal Aviation Act only permits Respondent to 
fly charters at set published prices. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 
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The great body of law on this issue cited by Appel-
lant1 s brief sounds exclusively in contract or agency. Respond-
ent's only rebuttal to these cases is the evasive response that 
Appellant should not be able to pursue its remedy in contract 
or agency unless it also simultaneously pursues a remedy in tort 
for tortious interference. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 19, 35) 
Again Appellant has asserted this major argument without any 
citation of legal authority. 
POINT IV 
CAB REGULATIONS DO NOT PRECLUDE A RECOVERY BY 
APPELLANT. 
Respondent argues the interesting proposition that 
it is required to pay only one commission pursuant to Regulations 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which payment is made only pur-
suant to a written charter agency agreement. Respondent acknow-
ledges that while it is willing to pay one 5% commission, it 
obviously wants to protect itself from the possibility of being 
compelled to pay two or more 5% commissions. Certainly, no one 
can fault Respondent for desiring to shield itself from the pay-
ment of double commissions. 
Respondent goes one step farther and indicates that 
it must "thus have a means of protecting itself" (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 31) , and that ijE a written contract is the sole 
criterion of obtaining such commission, the problem of possible 
double liability of Respondent is easily eliminated. 
-8-
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Respondent, however, fails to consider the testimony-
setting out the established practice of Respondent when such a 
claim for "double commissions" is made. Mr. Mansfield, Regional 
Vice President of Sales of Respondent, testified that when a 
dispute arises between two parties as to their entitlement to 
commissions that Respondent " . . . don't pay anyone until the 
dispute is settled among the other people." (Tr. 177) 
Respondent, in addition, urges that the regulations 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board protect Respondent in determining 
to whom the commissions should be payable. There is absolutely 
no foundation for such an assertion in the regulations of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. The CAB regulations say that Respondent 
can pay only one commission. The regulation does not say to whom 
the commission should be paid in the event of a dispute between 
parties. Here Respondent determined to pay the commission to 
the wrong party (Prestige), in violation of Respondent's estab-
lished practice and notwithstanding the fact that Appellant 
introduced the parties, negotiated the sale of the Chain "C" and 
Chain "D" flights, negotiated reduction in the deposit require-
ments for the flights and otherwise performed under the agreement 
between the parties the existence of which agreement was admitted 
by stipulation. The CAB regulation is clearly not designed to 
protect Respondent from its own conduct in paying commissions 
to a party without regard to its legal obligations or to someone 
who has not earned them. 
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Respondent likewise disregards that section of the 
Federal Aviation Act which clearly delineates that nothing in 
that legislation shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies 
existing at common law. 
- POINT V 
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY COMMISSIONS FOR 
THE CHAIN "C" AND CHAIN "D" FLIGHTS. 
With respect to Respondent's argument that Appellant 
has received at least in part commissions on the Chain "C" and 
Chain "D" flights as set out in Finding of Fact XV (R. 802), 
adopted by the trial court, Appellant respectfully submits that 
such a finding and conclusion cannot be justified by the evidence. 
The parties in the instant case stipulated as to what 
the payment of $7,287.00 from Capitol to Prestige represented, 
i.e., commissions on the Chain "A" flights (R. 818). 
While there was no evidence at the trial of this case 
as to the payment of any other sums, counsel for Respondent 
argued that an additional amount had also been received in settle-
ment of the Prestige litigation (Tr. 340-347). In that regard, 
it is noted that the Prestige litigation involved claims and 
allegations in addition to the claim for commissions, which 
other claims were compromised, settled and released (Ex. D-53). 
49 U.S.C.A. § 1506. 
-10-
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Appellant timely moved to set the Findings and Con-
clusions, including Finding of Fact XV aside, but the trial 
court denied Appellant's motion and adopted such Finding as 
submitted by Respondent's counsel, notwithstanding the Court's 
own acknowledgement that Finding XV is not one upon which the 
Court based its Findings (Tr. 345). 
POINT VI 
THE SEQUENCE AND TIMING OF EVENTS SHOW CON-
CLUSIVELY TEAT TEE EXECUTION OF THE CHARTER 
AGENCY AGREEMENT WAS ONLY A FORMALITY. 
The brokerage agreement between the parties provided 
that the airline (respondent), the travel agent (appellant), and 
the customer (Prestige), would all sign a document called a 
charter agency agreement. Respondent's defense in this lawsuit 
is simply that the document was not signed by Prestige and, 
therefore, the airline (respondent) owes no sales commission 
to the travel agent (appellant). Appellant has argued that the 
failure of Prestige to execute such an agreement was due to the 
unfair conduct of Respondent in dealing directly with Prestige. 
The sequence of events shows conclusively that the execution of 
that agreement was only a formality. Again Respondent has failed 
to meet that issue head on and has instead tried to artfully dodge 
and avoid the issue. The record clearly shows that Respondent 
never circulates that agreement for signature before the charter 
contract negotiations. Rather, Respondent always circulates 
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that document for signatures after all the negotiations for the 
sale of the charters are completed (R. 811). 
After all the negotiations for chartering the airplane 
are finished, and after the charter contract is consummated, 
then and only then does Respondent produce the charter agency 
agreement and request signatures. It is simply unfair and uncon-
scionable for a seller to induce a broker to do all the work and 
then avoid responsibility for paying a commission because a docu-
ment was not formalized after all of the substantive work was 
finished. Respondent urges this Court to ignore the time, effort 
and performance of the Appellant in connection with the Chain "C" 
and Chain MD" flights and by so doing ratify and approve the 
payment of the 5% sales commission on said flights to Prestige. 
Respondent places great emphasis on the argument that 
the parties had previously signed a charter agency agreement 
with respect to the Chain "A" flights. A reading of Respondent's 
Brief on this particular argument could easily lead to the con-
clusion that the charter agency agreement with respect to the 
Chain "A" flights was signed by the parties and that Respondent 
paid Appellant the 5% commission with respect to said flights 
in the normal course of Respondent's business. However, the plain 
fact is that notwithstanding the execution of a Charter Agency 
Agreement with respect to the Chain "A" flights, the payment of 
the commissions was made only after a suit was instituted by 
Appellant to recover those commissions (R. 818) . Thus on the 
-12-
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one hand Respondent claims that the execution of the charter 
agency agreement is conclusive and determinative on the issue 
of who gets commissions and on the other hand Respondent refused 
payment of such commissions even where the charter agency agree-
ment was signed by all parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant therefore urges that the judgment of the 
trial court be reversed, as heretofore submitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARK W. SESSIONS and 
GREGORY B. MONSON of 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL: 
CLARK)W. SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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